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Abstrak: Argumen Filosofis Kebangkitan Jasmani: Mengkaji Ulang
Pemikiran Eskatologi Mullâ Shadrâ. Selain meneliti tentang makna kematian,
hakikat ruh, bukti adanya kehidupan setelah mati, eskatologi juga mengkaji tentang
kebangkitan ruh dan jasmani. Berkenaan dengan ruh, hampir seluruh filosof Muslim
menyepakati tentang adanya kebangkitan ruh. Sementara terkait dengan jasmani,
sebagian filosof mengatakan akan dibangkitkan dan sebagian yang lain berpendapat
tidak mungkin dibangkitkan. Berbeda dengan para filosof essensialis sebelumnya,
Mullâ Shadrâ yang menganut aliran eksistensialis menyatakan bahwa sebagaimana
ruh, jasmani manusia pun akan ikut dibangkitkan di hari kemudian. Shadrâ berargumen
melalui pendekatan filsafat eksistensialis yang bertumpu pada prinsip harakah al-
jauhariyah (trans-substantial motion). Melalui pendekatan ini, Shadrâ berhasil mem-
buktikan secara filosofis tentang keharusan kebangkitan ruh dan jasmani secara
bersamaan di hari kemudian.
Abstract: Apart from investigating the meaning of death, reality of soul, proof of
life after death, eschatology also studies the sole bodily resurrection. With regard
to soul, almost all Muslim philosophers agree on soul resurrection, but they differ
however, as far as the body is concerned. Different to the previous essensialists
philosophers, Mullâ Shadrâ who adhered to existentialist school argued that as the
case of soul, man’s body itsel would be similarly resurrected in the hereafter. Shadrâ
supported his argument by existensialist philosophy approach leaned on the principle
of trans-substantial motion. Through this approach, Shadrâ succeeded philosophically
in proofing the necessity of soul and bodily resurrection simultaneously in the hereafter.
Key Words: eschatology, soul, body,mabda‘, ma‘ad, resurrection
Introduction
The issues of eschatology and the afterlife have always generated a great deal of speculation.
People speculate on when it will happen, how it is going to be done, how it is going to affect
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them, and if such things really will occur or not. This issue is a very important dimension
in all religions, especially Islam. According to Islam, human life has no meaning without
resurrection. How can there be purpose if people are born, live, and die and are not judged
for their deeds? How can there be justice if everybody is treated in the same way?
To believe in the “last day” is a fundamental instrument of Islamic faith. In Islam,
human and cosmic histories have an end just as they have a beginning. The wordma’âd
(“return” or “place of return”) andmabda` (“origin” or “place of origin”)are keywords used
to talk about the end and the beginning of human life. The concept of ma‘âd is closely
bound to the concept ofmabda` (“origin” or “place of origin”).1 The topic of “the origin and
the return” covers everything that connects to a human’s effort in achieving his suitable
place in creation or reaching his perfection, whether moral, spiritual, or intellectual.2
Unlike the problem of the origin, the problem of the return is much more controversial
and has been studied since the early times of Islam. This topic is not only found in the works
of Muslim theologians but also in the works of Muslim philosophers. There are several
issues that frequently appear in their works such as the meaning of death, the nature of
the human soul, the evidence of afterlife, the eschatological process, spiritual resurrection,
and bodily resurrection. Of these issues, spiritual resurrection and bodily resurrection
are the most studied by Muslim philosophers. Interestingly, all Muslim philosophers agree
as to what is called spiritual resurrection.
However, the Muslim philosophers’ agreement on spiritual resurrection was not
followed by an agreement on the issue of bodily resurrection. This issue brought to a head
a conflict between Islamic speculative theology (kalâm) and philosophy. In a broad sense,
there are two major points of view about this topic. Firstly, there are those who believe that
there is only a spiritual resurrection. Secondly, there are those who affirm that there is a
spiritual and bodily resurrection in the world to come. Such a problem needs to be resolved
by doing some philosophical investigation on the issue. Mullâ Shadrâ’s philosophical
thought is a good source to begin with. There is no doubt that Mullâ Shadrâ has made a great
contribution to the development of Islamic philosophy. His inquiries on Islamic philosophy
are believed to be the most systematic that have ever existed.
1The origin and the return are two major issues in Islamic cosmology. On the whole, Islamic
cosmology deals with three main issues which are the problem of origin, meaning, and destiny.
Cognizance of the origin and the return is the only way to earn the meaning. Cognizance of the
origin is built on the proposition “Allah is the origin of all becoming and motion”, while cognizance
of destiny is based on the proposition “everything returns to Allah”. For further information on
this topic, see Idris Samawi Hamid, Islam Dynamic: The Cosmology and Spirituality of Walayah
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2008), p. 133.
2William C. Chittick, Islamic Spirituality Foundations, edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (New
York: Crossroad, 1987), p. 378.
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The Soul-Body Problem in Shadrâ’s Philosophy
The discussions regarding the soul-body problem may be tracked back to the early
period of philosophical inquiry.3 Based on historical sources, there were only two well-known
theories regarding the soul-body problem. One upheld the theory of dualism, and the other
took one of two antagonistic positions: idealism or materialism. Plato and Aristotle were
predecessors to these two opposing views which later on became known as the dualistic
and monistic views of man.
Plato, and many other ancient philosophers, held a dualist view of soul and body.
He considered the soul to be an immaterial reality independent of matter, which existed
before the body and joined it when the body was well disposed to receive the soul. In their
outlooks, the soul would accompany the body as long as the latter had necessary power.
In this theory, the soul is regarded as the essential part, the essence of the self, which
constitutes the mental life of the self and survives the dissolution of the body.4
Aristotle and his followers considered the soul to be the form of a being that defines
or expresses the being’s modes of behavior in the public world. In his elucidation of the
relation between the soul and body, he argued that the former was related to the latter as
was a form to a matter. It is not dualistic, but in fact, the body is also the very instrument
of the soul, for matter is merely potency and exists only in so far as it is necessary for the
realization of a form, whereas, the soul is inevitably bound up with the body, and can have
no life apart from it. In this sense, Aristotle considered the soul and the body as the two united,
but separated in substance. For him, the soul can be known only through the functions
of the body. Its capacity to receive the soul gives the body its nature and existential constitution,
and it becomes a tool by which the soul goes on to act, that is, the soul gives life, actuality,
and form to the body and is in fact tied and connected to the body. Without the soul, man’s
body is lifeless, and man is not man.5
Mullâ Shadrâ, however, introduced a third theory. His theory of the soul can be
regarded as a kind of synthesis of Plato and Aristotle theories. In his view, despite what
3Concepts of the soul vary from one religious tradition to another, and from one philosophical
system to another. In some systems the term is almost synonymous with ‘spirit’; in others, the
term virtually overlaps with ‘mind’. Some thinkers envisage the soul as existing independently
of the body; other atheistic or empiricist thinkers reject both the credibility and intelligibility of
the notion. Daniel Dennett, a contemporary atheistic philosopher, for instance, argues against philo-
sophers of mind who still believe that human consciousness arises from an immaterial substance like
a rational soul. As an atheistic philosopher, Dennett consistently rejects the Cartesian dualistic
model which holds that mind is a nonphysical substance. Instead, he proposes the Darwinian
materialism model which holds that human are complex machines, and the mind is just the
motion of brain cells and neurological processes. To be more details, see Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking
the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Viking, 2006), p. 302-306.
4Anthony C. Thiselton,A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oneworld,
2002), p. 288.
5Ibid., p. 289.
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had been said by Plato, the soul is corporeal when it comes into being. It is as if oozes from
the body and then makes a form for itself. Also, contrary to what the Aristotle andperipatetic
philosophers believed, the soul is not a stationary and motionless substance, but a substance
which is essentially an outcome of motion, and has motion in itself. At the same time,
Mullâ Shadrâ accepted the definition of the soul provided by the peripatetic philosophers
who define the soul as an immaterial substance, indivisible in its essence, and not of the
same kind as material things. In its earthly or temporal plane of existence, the soul originated
with the body, and has an essential and natural unity with that body, and cannot be escaped
on this existential level. The connection between the soul and its body is similar to the
connection between form and matter in that the two are mutually dependent upon each
other for their own realization.6
 The soul, as defining form for the matter of the body, represents the body’s final perfection
and, Shadrâ says, is like its very “being” (wujûd), while the body is the soul’s “existence or
existentiation” (maujûdiyyah); that is, the body facilitates the soul’s individuated and distinct
existence apart from the undifferentiatedwujûdof the Intellect, just as the soul individuates
and distinguishes the body from undifferentiated matter. The body is moreover the means
through which the privative soul can reach its own perfection, although Shadrâ cautions
that the body should not be understood merely as an “instrument” at the disposal of the soul,
as most previous philosophers have argued, for the connection between the soul and the
body is stronger and more essential than the relationship between an agent and the instrument
of his action.7
Through the process of trans-substantial motion, the soul traverses through the various
levels or stations of being until it finally attains complete independence of all matter and
potentiality and is capable of enjoying immortal life. According to the nature of soul and
its various levels or stations, Shadrâ writes:
The human soul has many levels and stations, from the beginning of its generation to
the end of its goal; and it has certain essential states and modes of being. At first, it is a
corporeal substance. Then it gradually becomes more and more intensified and develops
through the different stages of its natural constitution until it subsists by itself and
moves from this world to the other world, and so returns to its Lord. Thus, the soul is
originated in a corporeal state, but endures in a spiritual state. The first thing to be
generated in its state is a corporeal power; next is a natural form, then the sensible
soul with its levels, then the cogitative and recollective; and then the rational soul.8
6Sayyid Muhammad Khamenei, The Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming,
edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (London: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2003), p. 18.
7Maria Massi Dakake, “The Soul as Barzakh: Substantial Motion and Mullâ Shadrâ’s Theory
of Becoming,” in The Muslim World, vol. 94, p. 107.
8James Winston Morris, The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Mullâ Shadrâ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 131-132.
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Mullâ Shadrâ delineates the various stages of the development of the human soul from
the vegetative soul (al-nafs al-nabâtiyyah) to the animal soul (al-nafs al-hayawâniyyah),
and to the rational soul (al-nafs al-nâthiqah) with its practical intellect (al-‘aql al-‘amali) and
theoretical intellect (al-nafs al-nazhâri) and to the subsequent stages of the development
of the theoretical intellect from the intellect in potentiality (al-‘aql bi al-quwwah) to the
intellect in actuality (al-‘aql bi al-fi‘il) which finally achieves union with the Active Intellect
(al-‘aql al-fa‘âl).9 Shadrâ identifies the Active Intellect with the Holy Spirit (al-rûh al-
quds) or archangel Gabriel who is the Angel of Revelation in Islam. In order to attain the highest
level of unity with the Active Intellect, human needs the Divine aid and grace.10
In addition to such process, Shadrâ contends that at each stage of its journey of becoming
or ascent from a lower and less intense mode of being to a higher and more intense mode
of being, the soul acquires a new set of faculties commensurable to its particular level or
mode of being. To illustrate, as a mineral, it has the faculty of preserving its form. As a
plant, it possesses the faculties of breeding, growth and the transformation of foreign substances
into its own form. Then, as an animal it develops the faculties of motion and various forms
of desire and the external senses. As a higher animal, the inner faculties of memory and
imagination are added to its present set of faculties. Finally, as a human being, the five
inner faculties are developed. These are the faculties of the perception of forms (hiss al-
musytarak), the apprehension (wahm) which perceives meanings, fantasy (khayyâl) which
preserves forms, memory (dzâkirah) which preserves meanings and the faculties of imagination
and thought. Mullâ Shadrâ contends that throughout these various stages of development,
it is the one single soul which is involved. The faculties are not things added to the soul, rather
they are the potential aspects of the soul becoming actualized.11
Turn to the distinction between the soul and the body, Mullâ Shadrâ sometimes refers
to the capacity of the soul and the body to acquire forms and to deal with them independently.
Following Ibn Sînâ and Suhrawardî, he maintains that the body can bear only one form
or quality at a time; and, if it looses a quality, it cannot regain it without an external cause.
But the soul can independently preserve, remember and reproduce any intelligible fort
at any time. It is like a board containing various sciences and knowledge of innumerable
objects. He also argues that man is capable of conceiving universals and intelligible forms
which cannot be formed in the body. This is because the body is infinitely divisible; whereas
an intelligible form is indivisible.
9In some extends, the development of the soul from an inanimate thing to vegetation,
and then to animality and humanity are similar to the developments produced by heat in coal
and iron. When iron is initially heated, it may be likened to the origins of vegetative life, when
iron turns to hot red, it can be compared with the origins of animal life, and when iron is burned,
it is like the origins of the rational faculty. The phenomenon is the same; it takes, however, various
developmental forms. To be more details, see Khamanei, The Passions, p. 20.
10Zailan Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and Reason in the Philosophy of Mullâ Shadrâ
(London: Routledge, 2003), p. 156.
11Ibid., p. 106.
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Continuing his argument, Mullâ Shadrâ maintains that another evidence for duality
of the soul and the body is their “opposite directions” in the process of development. While
continuous and intense intellectual activities eventually lead the body to weakness, which
may end in death and dissolution, they produce mental perfection and intellectual maturity.
It is evident that it would be impossible for the same thing to be the cause of both the
perfection and the destruction of a thing at the same time. Therefore, the soul or the mind
is something other than the body. This is similar to what is offered in the classical argument
in the Peripatetic tradition. They argue that intensive sense-perception eventually weakens
the body, while intellectual activity brings the mind to maturity.12
In spite of this eagerness to prove a clear duality of the soul and the body, Mullâ Shadrâ
attempts to show that an intimate and metaphysical link exists between them. He goes
so far as to assert that the body and the soul are two levels of one existent. The body is the
state or stage of hardness and heaviness for that being, whereas the soul constitutes a degree
of lightness and subtlety. Here, one may ask how these two distinct existents come to be so
intimately linked together. Leaving it unanswered, saying that it is a divine secret, Mullâ
Shadrâ nevertheless gives an example. He states that just as the material of the wick gets
ready to accept fire and then gradually becomes red and bright until it becomes luminous
and burning, so the human sperm gets physically ready to accept the rational soul, which
is a spark from heaven and then develops until it unites with the Active Intellect. As we
shall see, Mullâ Shadrâ attempts to demonstrate that although the soul is an immaterial
being, and quite distinct from body, its creation is based on a corporeal origination.13
Having said that, Shadrâ demonstrates that to prove the existence of the soul, one is
not required to prove a being other than that of the body, for both of them (body and soul)
exist through the same existence. Evidently, the body exists, and thus the existence of the
soul is proved as well, for the soul is a faculty in the body. Thus, at the beginning of the origination
of the soul and the body, the being of the soul is not separated from that of the body. It is like
the existence of the accident, which is same as the existence of the substance in which the
former is realized. The only difference is that once the substance is destroyed, the accident
is destroyed as well; but when the body is destroyed, the soul will not perish, for the way
in which the soul grows and perfects itself is other than the way of the body. Their beings are
united in origination; in terms of substance, however, the change into two parallel beings.14
Another issue that is related to the soul is whether it has an eternal pre-existence (qadím),
or whether it is created in time (hadits) just like the body. Moreover, if it is said to be a created
existence, one may ask again whether the soul joins the body as a physical thing, which
12Abbas Ali Shameli, “A Comparative Study Concerning the Soul-body Problem in the
Philosophical Psychology of Mullâ Shadrâ (1571-1640) and Ibn Sînâ (980-1037)” (Thesis,
McGill University: Canada, 1995), p. 40.
13Ibid., p. 41.
14Khamanei, The Passions, p. 19.
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then changes into an incorporeal existent, or it joins the body as a created incorporeal thing.
Dealing with this issue, Mullâ Shadrâ maintains that the soul is physical only in its createdness
(huduts) but changes gradually into immaterial quiddity after it has been created in the body.15
He argues that it is impossible for the soul to be eternal, since then it must pre-exist either
in form of the soul or the intellect (‘aql). If it pre-exists in the form of the soul, it must be
inactive (mu`awwal) waiting to connect to a body. If it rather pre-exists as an intellect,
how can it bear any new accident when it is actual, without having any potentiality. In
addition to this notion, Shadrâ argues that if the soul existed before the body, then there
would have to be either a plurality of souls or one soul. The plurality of the souls, he claims,
is impossible since in their prior existence they are immaterial and since matter is the
individuating principle, these souls cannot be many. However, the supposition of one
soul is equally impossible. In this sense, we cannot say that the soul of an individual like
Joseph would be identical with soul of an individual like Salomon. If, then, in the supposed
prior existence there can be neither a plurality of souls nor one soul, the prior existence
of the soul to the body is impossible. Thereby, the soul cannot exist before the body but
must exist with body.16
In line with this argument, Shadrâ explicitly writes in Kitâb al-’Arsyiyyah:
The soul of Adam has a form of existence preceding the body, without this entailing the
transmigration of souls, and without necessitating the pre-eternity of the (individual)
soul, which is the well-known view of Plato. This (mode of pre-existence) does not require
a multiplicity of individuals of a single species or their differentiation without reference
to any matter or (material) preparedness; nor does it entail the soul’s being divided
after having been one, in the manner of continuous quantities; nor does it presume
the soul’s inactivity before (being connected with) bodies. Rather, soul’s pre-existence
is as we have indicated and explained in our commentary onHikmat al-Ishrâq in a way
that cannot be surpassed.17
In addition to soul-body problem, Shadrâ Shadrâ avoids the dualism of his Platonic
and Isyrâqipredecessors, who would see the body as dark, dead, lifeless matter, or as something
that imprisons the soul. Rather, for Shadrâ, the body has an organic connection with the soul
until the moment of death, which can be viewed as positive and nurturing, rather than simply
limiting and inhibitive. He admits that the soul initially depends upon the body for the
15In Kitâb ‘Arshiyya, Shadrâ summarized this ideas by saying that the soul originates as
body but subsists as spirit; jasmâniyyat al-huduth rûhâniyyat al-baqâ. In the beginning, the
soul is connected with the body and is a corporeal substance, however, through the process of
trans-substantial motion, the soul becomes gradually intensified and its mode of existence or
being is likewise transformed until it attains independence from the body and finally subsists
as spirit and returns to its Lord. For further information on this topic, see Mullâ Shadrâ, Kitab
al-’Arsyiyyah (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Tarikh al-‘Arabi, 2000), p. 33.
16Shameli, “A Comparative,” p. 42.
17Morris, The Wisdom, p. 140.
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manifestation of its faculties. However, the soul eventually becomes independent of the
body, such that the body’s passing away does not harm the soul, nor does it in any way
compromise those faculties of the soul once facilitated by the body—such as the senses.
For Shadrâ, those senses continue on the psychic plane, even after the death of the body. Thus,
Shadrâ takes the position that the pleasures and torments of the next life will be experiences
purely on the psychic level—not on the physical level as asserted by most Ash‘arite theologians,
nor on a purely intellectual level, as asserted by many Islamic philosophers.
Shadrâ’s Philosophical Reflection on Bodily Resurrection
As we have seen in the above discussion, Shadrâ’s theory of the soul and its
transformation is characterized above all by the notion of fluidity and the rejection of
any notion of ontological divisibility or discontinuity for the soul in its many faculties
and levels of existence. He mentions that in the process of the soul’s realization of higher
states, and at every progressive stage, the soul’s wujûd becomes “another wujûd.” This
new “wujûd” is not really “new” in the sense of being created at every point of progress.
Rather, for Shadrâ, all of the levels of wujûd are integrally related to one another such
that, as we have seen, the relationship between the higher and lower intensities or degrees
of wujûd is precisely the relationship of the cause to its effect. The lesser intensities of
wujûd are contained within and emanate from the higher, just as the effect is contained
within and emanates from its cause. The movement through higher and higher intensities
of wujûd is ultimately nothing more than a re-integration of the lower levels of wujûd
within the higher ones from which they had originally emerged.18
Accordingly, Mullâ Shadrâ avoids the transmigration of the soul.19 In line with his
theory of trans-substantial motion, he argues that the process of human becoming is an
irreversible progress and cannot be seen as a movement from a more perfect or developed
to a less perfect and undeveloped rank of existence. A being, like a human soul in a developed
human body, is not expected to take an animal body, which is less perfect than a human
body and is at a lower rank of being. In other words, demotion in trans-substantial change
is not only absurd but impossible.20 However, Shadrâ realizes that the human souls that
achieve perfection are very extremely few in number. The vast majorities of individual
souls are imperfect and have not accomplished the highest level of intellectual perfection
18Dakake, “The Soul,” p. 122.
19Shadrâ’s denial of the transmigration of the soul is surrounded by certain serious problems,
some of which arise from religious texts and others from certain philosophic views concerning
the destiny of undeveloped human soul. Among the religious difficulties are statements in the
Qur’an that a group of people, because of their bad deeds, were changed into monkeys and pigs
by God. The problem is that religious text seemingly recognizes the transmigration of the human
souls with another body. To be more details, see Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullâ Shadrâ
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1975), p. 248.
20Ibid.
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which is united to the Active Intellect. Elsewhere inKitâb al-‘Arshiyyah, Shadrâ also rejects
Aristotle’s and Alexander Aphrodisias’s21 thought which asserts that only the intellect in
man to be immortal and therefore only that part of the human soul which has become
actualized in the intelligible world to survive death. The question is how Shadrâ solve this
problem?
Mullâ Shadrâ’s treatment of this matter takes the middle position between the views
of those who believe in the survival of the intellect after death, and those who accept the
survival of the body as well. According to Shadrâ, Alexander Aphrodisias was wrongly to
suppose that there exist only two kinds of worlds: the world of material bodies and the
world of intellects. Consequently, there is no place for imperfect souls which have no
become fully actualized. In response to this supposition, Shadrâ asserts that there is an
imaginal world22 which is intermediate between the spiritual and sensible worlds. All the
souls which have not attained perfection or unity with the Active Intellect will be placed
in the intermediate world. In Kitâb al-’Arsyiyyah, Shadrâ explicitly writes:
But it is not like that (Shadrâ is referring to Aphrodisias’s supposition). Instead, there
is another world of being, alive and sensible (mahsûsah) by essence, unlike this (physical)
world—a world that is perceived by these true (inner) senses (al-hawâs haqíqah), not
by these transient external ones (al-hawâs al-dzâhirah). That world is divided into a
sensible Paradise (al-jannah al- mahsûsah) containing the felicities of the blessed (na‘ím
al-su‘adâ), including food, drink, marriage, sensual desire and all that could delight
the soul and give pleasure to the eyes; and a sensible Hell (nâr mahsûsah) containing
the punishments of the wretched (‘adzâb al-‘asyqiyâ`), including hellfire, torments,
serpents and scorpions. If this imaginal world did not exist, what Alexander Aphrodisias
mentioned would be undeniably true and that would mean that the Sacred Laws
(syar‘iyyah) and divine books (al-kutub al-ilâhiyyah) were lying when they maintained
the resurrection (ba’ats) for everyone.23
21Alexander Aphrodisias (Iskandar Afradisy) is one of Neo-Platonic commentators whose
works were very popular among Muslim philosophers. His commentaries were translated into
Arabic along with the actual Aristotelean corpus. They contained some controversial issues
among Islamic, Jewish, and Latin Christian philosophers. For further information, see Moris,
Revelation, p. 149.
22The central importance of the imaginal world in Islamic metaphysical discourse was
brought out for the first time by Ibn ‘Arabi and then Suhrawardî. Mullâ Shadrâ expands the
metaphysics of this world and brings out its epistemological, eschatological, and cosmological
significance in a masterly way. By definition, the imaginal world is the intermediate world
residing ontologically between the physical and the purely intellectual. In Shadrâ’s philosophy,
the exposition of the imaginal world was integrated with his general ontology which are the
unity of existence (wahdat al-wujûd), primacy of existence (awalat al-wujûd), and gradation
of existence (tashkík al-wujûd). For further information, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic
Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2006), p. 230.
23Shadrâ, Kitab al-’Arsyiyyah, p. 44.
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According to such ideas, the bodies of the undeveloped souls, the souls that have
committed sins, deteriorate at the time of death and are not reassembled as before. In order
to survive physically, they create a material body for themselves by externalizing their inner
psychic states in the form of a body in the imaginal world, where all psychic states and
dispositions are transformed into concrete images. It is in the imaginal world that the
souls will experience certain eschatological events described in the Qur’an and the Hadith.24
Shadrâ’s classification on spiritual, imaginal, sensible worlds can be illustrated as follows:
In addition to such description, there are two essential themes largely discussed in
the Kitâb al-’Arsyiyyah which are related to the issue of resurrection: (1) the nature of the
human soul and its incredible potentiality, and (2) the immortality of the imaginative
power of the human soul. According to the nature of human soul, Shadrâ asserts that
the human soul is the conjunction of the terminal point of the sensible world and the initial
point of the spiritual world. It has capacity to of having control over the sensible world and
the capacity of entering into the spiritual world. For this notion, Shadrâ writes:
The human soul is the fastest of all generated things so far as its changes in the physical,
psychic, and intellective modalities of being. In the initial stages of its fundamental generated
of nature, the soul is the ending of the sensible world (nihâyat al-‘âlam al-mahsûsah)
and the starting of the spiritual world (bidâyat al-‘âlam al-rûhâniyyah). It is the greatest
gateway to God (bâb allah al-a‘lâm), through which one can be brought to the Highest
Kingdom (al-malakût al-A‘lâ). However, it also has all of the gates to the Hell. It is the
separator standing between this world (al-dunyâ) and the other world (al- âkhirâh)
because it is the form (shûrah) of every potency (quwwâh) in this world and the matter
(mâddah) for every form in another world. Thus, the soul is the junction of the two seas
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24Rahman, The Philosophy, p. 248.
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of corporeal and spiritual things; its being the last of the corporeal realities is a sign
of its being the first of the spiritual ones.25
On the immortality of the imaginative power (quwwâh khayyâliyyah) of the human
soul, Shadrâ contends that it is a substance which is independent of the sensible world;
it is immaterial and immortal and it does not die when the body dies. Though the imaginative
power is of a substance which is independent of the sensible world, it is not without
connection to it. Shadrâ asserts that the imaginative power is not totally independent of
the worlds of generated being (kawnain) which are this world and the next world. If the
imaginative power were to be totally independent of both worlds, then it would be pure
intellect (‘aql) or spirit. In Kitâb al-’Arsyiyyah, Shadrâ states:
In man, the imaginal power is a substance which is independent of this world (jawhar
mujarrad), that is, the world of physical beings (al-akwân al-tabi‘iyyah), the motions
(harakah), and transformations of the material things. We set forth decisive proofs
about this matter in our bookal-Asfâr al-Arba‘ah. But this power is not totally independent
of generated being (al-kawnain), since in that case it would have to be pure intellect
(‘aql) and object of intellection (ma‘qûl).26
For Shadrâ, the imaginative power belongs to or is a part of the imaginal world. The
imaginative power has it locus in the human soul. The relation between the imaginative
power and the soul is not in the manner is not something inhering in another thing but
in the way an act is related to its agent. The fundamental role of imaginative power is to
perceive the imaginal forms.27 The complete manifestation of the imaginal forms and the
imaginative power will be experienced fully after death when the soul is separated from
the body. In the posthumous state, the individual will perceive the full manifestation and
intensity of the imaginal forms and come to realize that the sensible forms of the material
world are weaker and less real, relative to the imaginal forms. According to such ideas,
Shadrâ says:
The complete manifestation of these forms and the perfection of these forms and the
perfection of the power of their being occur only after death. This is true to such a degree
that compared to the forms man will see after death, the forms he sees in this world are
like dreams. This is why the Commander of the truly faithful (Imam Ali) said: “Mankind
25Shadrâ, Kitâb al-’Arsyiyyah, p. 42-43.
26Ibid., p. 36.
27The imaginal form is a level of being which is higher and more intense than that of the sensible
world. The imaginal form is a kind of phantom image with objective existence or reality. For majority
of the people, the imaginal forms are hidden from them and if manifested in the dream state are
often weak due to their souls’ immense attachment with the body. According to Mullâ Shadrâ,
the degree of manifestation (zuhûr) or hiddennesss (khifâ’) and intensity (shadda) or weakness (da’ íf)
of the imaginal form which are perceived by the imaginative power is dependent on the strength
of the imaginative power itself. To be more details, see Shadrâ, Kitab al-’Arsyiyyah, p. 37.
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are sleeping; when they die, they awaken.” Then the unseen becomes immediate vision.
This is the secret of the return and the resurrection of the body.28
In observing Imam ‘Ali’s Hadith which is stated above, Shadrâ contends that the
natures of forms in the Afterlife, while resembling the imaginal forms experienced in
our dream state or in mirrors in this life, are not essentially the same. The existence of
things in the Afterlife, although resembling the existence of forms which people see in
sleep or in a mirror in one respect, are not so in actuality. This is due to the fact that in the
Afterlife, the things people see and experience are imaginal representations of the fruits
of their actions in this world. But those forms which appear to us in sleep are not real in
the way the images we experience in our waking state are, nor are they real in the way
the forms presented to us in the Afterlife will be. Because of these considerations, Shadrâ
goes on to say that the existent form which appears in sleep and in the mirror is an impotent
thing whose appearance is pure fancy. Dreams imaginally represent to the dreamer the
contents of his conscience.
The same idea holds true for objects reflected in mirrors. The reflection of an object
in a mirror is not the object itself. At the same time, it does capture something of the true nature
of the object placed before the mirror. If it were otherwise, people would not, for example,
brush their hair in front of mirrors, nor would they rely upon them for any representations
of reality. The forms people receive in their dreams and in mirrors are therefore both real and
unreal. In the Afterlife, those things which are the imaginalizations of our actions in this
world, or, rather, the things which are represented to us as the physical manifestations of
our deeds here on earth, also reflect something of the reality with which we were engaged
in the previous world. On the other hand, these forms are not simply representations, as are
the objects reflected in mirrors or those images produced in dreams. They are more real than
either of these, since these forms belong to a different order of reality.29
The question is how are those forms represented to us in the Afterlife? To this question,
Shadrâ states that when the soul is separated from the body, it carries along with itself
the perceiving form which enables it to perceive sensible things through its inner sense
(hissi al-bâthin). Therefore, although at death the soul is separated from the body and the
external senses, the soul continues to perceive forms through its inner senses. At the same
time, the imaginative power will originate imaginal forms by its own volition (irâdah).
Concerning the origination of the form, Shadrâ states that it can be created by an individual
either with the appropriate material or without the presence of the necessary materials. He
supports this notion by giving the example of God’s creation of the planets and heavenly
bodies which are created from nothing. In his interpretation, the term ibda‘which is used
28Ibid.
29Mohammed Rustom, “Psychology, Eschatology, and Imagination in Mullâ Shadrâ Shirazi’s
Commentary on the Hadith of Awakening,” in Islam & Science, Vol. XXXII, p. 10.
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by many philosophers refers to God’s act of creating or originating something from nothing.
In Shadrâ’s account, the soul is endowed by God with a similar power to originate forms
from nothing. The imaginal forms which are originated from nothing by the human soul
exist in the soul. For Shadrâ, these imaginal forms, once again, are more substantial,
more firmly established and permanent in their reality than material forms which are
constantly changing and being regenerated.30
Based on such reflective thoughts, Shadrâ rejects the transmigrationists’s claims
which state that the union of the soul with the body in the hereafter is religiously supported,
and since the body will be resurrected is not the same body to which the soul was related
in its earthly existence, it clearly implies some kind of transmigration of the soul. To this
claim, Shadrâ replies that that body, being a symbolic expression of the soul’s inner states,
has no potentialities like the earthly body and possesses no existence of its own. It is a
mere symbol of the soul and is related to the soul as a reflection or a shadow; it has no
independent status or nature of its own. The opponent can say that the statements of the
Qur’an apparently say that the body in hereafter will be the same earthly body and not a
merely symbolic one. Shadrâ admits that this is so but adds that that body will have the
same form as this earthly body and not the matter of the earthly body. Even in this earthly
body, its identity is preserved by its form not by its matter, which is continuously changing.
The body of a human at any given moment in this life is really its identical form plus an
indeterminate matter. In the hereafter, this body will be pure physical form without
matter—but that physical form will preserve the identity of this body.31
The complete arguments of Mullâ Shadrâ concerning the necessity and the possibility
of bodily resurrection could be found in Kitâb al-‘Arsyiyyah. At the beginning of his second
illumination about the true reality of the return and the manner of the bodily resurrection,
he provides seven philosophical premises which are consistent with our previous
discussion. The seven premises32 can be summarized as follows:
1. The subsistence of everything is by virtue of its form, not is matter. In this sense, the
form is the actual ground of its quiddity, the completion of its reality, and the source
of its ultimate differentia. Thus, although we suppose that form to be separate from
its matter, the thing itself would remain regardless of that separation.
2. The individual identity of things is independent on their particular matter. According
to Mullâ Shadrâ, the individual identity of a thing is an expression for its particular mode
of being, whether it is material or separate from matter. For instance, Zayd is possible
30Moris, Revelation, p. 162.
31Rahman, The Philosophy, p. 249.
32Shadrâ claims that his arguments on bodily resurrection were built upon the divine book
(al-kitâb al-ilâhiyyah) and philosophical reflections. At the beginning of his arguments, he
quotes some verses of the Holy Qur’an which are related to necessity of bodily resurrection. To
see the full version of his argumentations, see Morris, The Wisdom, p. 153-157.
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to change in position, quantity, qualities, and location in time and space; however, he
is still precisely as Zayd.
3. The being remains one throughout the stages of its transformation, and that higher
level of being subsume the lower. In order to achieve perfection, individual being always
changes and transforms to a higher level of its position. The individuation of a being
is an aspect which is continually transformed and intensified in its substantiality
through a continuous motion with the property of continuous unity. Since it is one in
continuity, it is also one with respect to its being and its individuation.
4. The soul originates forms of being by pure intention, without material preparedness.
Without any association with a material container, location and preparedness, the
forms may occur by immediate creation thorough the conceptions and formative directions
of the maker (God). The forms subsist through the soul and exist in the domain of the soul.
5. The imaginal power of the soul is a substance essentially separate from the body. As
has been mentioned, the imaginal power in man is a substance whose being is actually
and essentially separate from this sensible body and physical frame. The imaginal
power remains regardless the collapse and decline of the bodily frame. The separation
of soul and body does not penetrate to its essence and its perceptions.
6. The soul’s perceptions are essentially of its own world, only accidentally related to
physical forms. The soul’s perceptions, whether in this world or in the other world, are
not things separate from his essence and different from his individuation. Its perception
only exists in his essence, not in something else. The need of material things in perceiving
imaginal forms of the soul is only at the very beginning of the development of sensation.
Thus, in the state of separation between soul and body, there is nothing to prevent the
soul from perceiving all that it perceives and senses in this life.
7. The soul can directly affect the body. The soul can directly cause external affects. In this
case, Shadrâ points out some example in our daily lives. For him, frightened, embarrassing,
and excitement of something are examples of how soul can directly affect our bodies.
Having provided the philosophical argumentations of the necessity of the bodily
resurrection, Shadrâ goes on to discuss the difference in mode of being between bodies
in this world and those of the world to come. In Kitâb al-’Arsyiyyah, he presents six
aspects of those differences:
1. Everybody in the other world is animated and alive, whereas in our world, there are
bodies deprived of life and consciousness, and where living bodies never have more
than an accidental and ephemeral life. In his own words, Shadrâ writes:
…everybody in the other world possesses the spirit of life, and indeed is living by
its very essence; one cannot even conceive of a body there not having life. That is quite
different from this world, where there are many bodies that do not possess life and
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consciousness—and even in those that do have life, their life is something that occurs
to them accidentally and is added to them.33
2. The bodies of this world receive their souls at the end of a process that makes them fit to
receive them, whereas the souls of the other world produce their own bodies in accordance
with their own needs. In his own words, Shadrâ states:
…the bodies in this world are receptive to their souls by way of their material
preparedness, while souls in the other world make their own bodies, by way of
immediate affirmation. Here, bodies and materials gradually ascend, according
to their states of preparedness and transformations, until they attain to the ranks
of souls. But in the other world, the command of creation and life descends from
souls into bodies.34
3. In this world, the potentiality is chronologically antecedent to an actuality, while the
actuality is ontologically antecedent to potentiality. In the other world, the potentiality
is chronologically and ontologically antecedent to actuality. InKitâb al-’Arsyiyyah, Shadrâ
explicitly explains, “…in this world, potentiality precedes actuality in time, while the
actuality is prior to the potentiality in essence. But there, the potentiality is prior to the
actuality both in essence and in being.”35
4. In this world, the actuality is nobler than potentiality because it is its fulfillment, whereas
in the other world, the potentiality is nobler than the actuality since it is that which produces
the actuality. InKitâb al-’Arsyiyyah, Shadrâ states, “Here, actuality is more exalted than
potentiality since it is the end (the final cause) of the potentiality. But there, potentiality is
more exalted than actuality, since it is the potentiality that actually makes the actuality.”36
5. Bodies and volume are in finite in the other world since they originate from the imaginations
and perceptions of souls, which are both infinite. According to this view, Shadrâ writes:
The bodies and objects of the other world are infinite, according to the number of
conceptions and perceptions of souls. It is because the proofs for the finitude of
(physical) dimensions do not apply to that world, but only within the confines and
dimensions of material things. Nor (despite the unlimited number of bodies) is
there any crowding or interference between things in the other world. And nothing
there is in a direction “inside” or “outside” of anything else.37
6. The bodies of the other world and all of its marvels exist through a single being since
each of them encompasses these things as a support from God. In his own words,
Shadrâ asserts:
33Shadrâ, Kitâb al-’Arsyiyyah, p. 54.
34Ibid.
35Ibid.
36Morris, The Wisdom, p. 165.
37Shadrâ, Kitâb al-’Arsyiyyah, p. 54.
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…the bodies of the other world and all of its marvels, including the gardens, rivers,
chambers, dwellings, palaces, pure companions, houris, and all of the other attendants,
servants, slaves, and retinues of the people of Paradise—all of these exist though a
single being, which is the being of each man among the people of blessedness. This
is because each of them encompasses these things as a support from God and lodging
from the Forgiving, the Merciful.38
In addition to such argumentations, Shadrâ also discusses three more topics which
are related to the issue of bodily resurrection. The first issue is concerning the true nature of
the other world of the soul. The second issue is concerning of his refutation to those who deny
the Return and the resurrection of the body. The third issue is concerning what survives of the
parts of a man in the other world. I will not go further on to talk about these issues since they
have been discussed intensely prior to this section. It seems to me that what we have discussed
so far is enough to know Shadrâ’s very basic philosophical reflection on bodily resurrection.
Conclusion
The issue of eschatology and the afterlife is a fundamental instrument of Islamic faith.
In the history of Islamic philosophy, there are many Muslim philosophers who have tried
to provide the philosophical arguments regarding the necessity of spiritual and bodily
resurrection. Of those philosophers, Mullâ Shadrâ (1572-1640) provides the most plausible
arguments that we can study today. Mullâ Shadrâ begins his argument by examining the
fundamental meaning of reality. In doing so, he turned his philosophy from the primary
of essence (ashalah al-mâhiyah) to primacy of existence (ashalah al-wujûd).
Based on his principle of the primacy of existence, Shadrâ goes on to next principle
which is called al-harakah al-jawhâriyyah (trans-substantial motion). According to this
principle, all existents in the world of nature are essentially transformable, and changeable,
and all their parts are continually in the process of creation and extinction. This is what
it is called the philosophy of becoming. In line with such notion, Mullâ Shadrâ asserts that
the process of human becoming is an irreversible progression and cannot be seen as a
movement from a more perfect or developed to a less perfect and undeveloped rank of
existence. A being, like a human soul in a developed human body, is not expected to take
an animal body, which is less perfect than a human body and is at a lower rank of being. In
other words, demotion in trans-substantial change is not only absurd but impossible. However,
Shadrâ realizes that the human souls that achieve perfection are very extremely few in
number. The vast majorities of individual souls are imperfect and have not accomplished
the highest level of intellectual perfection which is united to the Active Intellect. In response
to such fact, Mullâ Shadrâ asserts that there is an imaginal world which is intermediate
38Ibid., p. 55
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between the spiritual and sensible worlds. All the souls which have not attained perfection
or unity with the Active Intellect will be placed in the intermediate world.
In his effort to prove the necessity of bodily resurrection, Shadrâ introduces the
imaginative power (quwwâh khayyaliyah) which is a substance, immaterial, immortal,
independent of the sensible world, and does not die when the body dies. The fundamental
role of imaginative power is to perceive the imaginal forms. According to Shadrâ, when
the soul is separated from the body, it carries along with itself the perceiving form which
enables it to perceive sensible things through it inner sense (hissi al-bathin). At the same
time, the imaginative power will originate imaginal forms by its own volition. These imaginal
forms are more substantial, more firmly established and permanent in their reality than
material forms which are constantly changing and being regenerated.
With regard to such ideas, the body which will be resurrected in the afterlife is a
kind of symbolic expression of the soul’s inner state. That is why it has no potentialities like
the earthly body and it possesses no existence of its own. However, the body will have the
same form as this earthly body and not the matter of the earthly body. For Shadrâ, even in
this earthly body, its identity is preserved by its form, not by its matter. In this sense, body
of a human in this life is really its identical form plus an indeterminate matter. So, in the
hereafter, this body will be pure physical form without matter—but that physical form
will preserve the identity of this body.
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